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ESSAY

ON COMPETENCE, LEGITIMACY, AND PROPORTIONALITY

NANCY GERTNER

†

I asked Justice Aharon Barak, then president of the Israeli Supreme Court, why he considered himself competent to decide where
the wall between Israel and the Palestinian territories should be located and further, why it was legitimate for him, a judge, to do so. The
Israelis claimed that the wall was critical for the country’s security.
The Palestinians insisted that the barrier violated international law by
severely restricting the ability of Palestinians to travel freely and to access work in Israel. Justice Barak answered, “As a judge, I don’t pretend
to know anything about security. But I know about proportionality. I
know how to balance the security interests of the state against the rights
1
of the Palestinians.” His response was not unusual for justices of
†

Professor of Practice, Harvard Law School. Former Judge, U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts (1994–2011).
1
In Mara’abe v. Prime Minister, Justice Barak held that Israel, in balancing its security
against the harm to the Palestinians, must adhere to a standard of proportionality, consisting of three elements: (1) “a rational link between the means employed and the
goal,” (2) a demonstration that Israel has chosen the “least harmful means” to achieve
its security objective, and (3) a showing that “the damage caused to the individual by
the means employed . . . be of appropriate proportion to the benefit stemming from
it.” HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister 60(2) PD 477 para. 30 [2005] (Isr.),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/A14/04079570.a14.pdf; see also
Geoffrey R. Watson, International Decisions, Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 100 AM.
J. INT’L L. 895, 898 (2006) (“[T]he Court reiterated its holding . . . that Israel must
balance its own security against the harm to Palestinians and that Israel must, in particular, adhere to a standard of ‘proportionality.’”).
The Court concluded that the routing of a portion of Israel’s “security fence” in the
northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. Mara’abe, 60(2) PD 477
paras. 110-16. Justice Barak has elaborated on his theory of judicial legitimacy in
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 100-04 (2002).
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constitutional high courts in common law countries—except in the
United States. No other common law judge is likely to doubt his competence to use proportionality analysis in any number of areas or the
legitimacy of the approach. Indeed, proportionality analysis has be2
come a critical part of international human rights adjudication.
While the use of proportionality analysis is widespread in constitutional courts throughout the world, sentencing is an area in which it is
perhaps the most critical and has the oldest pedigree. Retributive
theories of punishment use the proportionality principle to assign
criminal blame; no offender should be punished more harshly than
3
the crime deserves. Prior to mandatory sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentencing, proportionality analysis was part of
4
the sentencing judge’s toolkit in an individual case. In most common
law countries with appellate review of sentencing, it was also the means
5
by which appellate courts reviewed lower court sentences. To be sure,
it was not a perfect approach and was hardly capable of mathematical
precision, but it was accepted.
Except in the United States. Let me make a preliminary observation: a common theme links the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in which some Justices debate whether there is a constitutional proportionality principle in noncapital sentencing at all; the
federal appeals courts’ inability to give meaning to substantive reasonableness sentencing review even after United States v. Booker freed them
6
to do so; and the United States Sentencing Commission’s inability to
2

See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 147-48 (2008) (detailing the European Court
of Human Rights’s turn to proportionality).
3
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66 (1976).
To be sure, there is a range of retribution theories. See Michael Tonry, Purposes and
Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 16-23 (2006) (discussing the normative functions of sentencing systems).
4
KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1998); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In exercising their discretion, sentencing judges wisely employed a proportionality principle that took into account all of the justifications for
punishment—namely, deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation.”
(citing STITH & CABRANES, supra, at 14)).
5
See Richard G. Fox, Case Note, Ryan v. The Queen: Paradox and Principle in Sentencing a Paedophilic Priest: Ryan’s Case in the High Court, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 178, 188
(2002) (discussing the application of proportionality to the sentencing of pedophiles);
Arie Freiberg, Australia: Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 204, 208, 211 & nn.49-50 (2010) (noting that courts in most parts of Australia are required by statute to consider proportionality).
6
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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rank offenses based on any coherent proportionality principle. The
theme (which I find quite troubling) is that proportionality analysis is
simply not within the competence of the American judiciary. Worse
yet, it is not even within their legitimate role; it is somehow too policycentered, too “activist.” It is a task best left to the legislature, or in the
case of the federal sentencing guidelines, to an “independent” agency
in the judicial branch the United States Sentencing Commission—but
at all costs, not to the courts.
The problem is that Congress has never applied a proportionality
principle in enacting the substantive criminal laws; all efforts to enact
a rational and proportional federal criminal code (along the lines of
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, for example) have
failed. Congress largely targets the “crime du jour,” increasing punishments not on the basis of proportionality analysis, but largely on the
7
basis of public pressure. And, as I describe below, the “expert” agency,
the Sentencing Commission, which had the resources and even the
charge to apply such a principle, simply threw up its hands.
It is no surprise, then, that over the course of my seventeen years
on the federal bench the government regularly urged me to sentence
a nonviolent crack offender to the same sentence as I would defendants convicted of crimes like attempted sedition, solicitation to commit
8
murder, kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint. Or that the
Court of Appeals overturned a decision in which I used empirical analysis to try to make the punishment of a drug offender proportional to the
9
punishment of other similarly situated dealers within Massachusetts.

7

See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (stating that legislators respond to the “crime du jour” to
gain political credit even if the new legislation is redundant); Nancy Gertner, Sentencing
Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 570, 571, 573 (2005) (mentioning
Congress’s attention to the “crime du jour” and failure to enact legislation that would
provide consistency among sentences); Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is
It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 195, 202 (1997) (“The federal government has never
enacted a true criminal code.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512-19, 529-33 (2001) (discussing redundancies in criminal codes that exist, in part, because of legislators’ incentives to pass criminal laws in
response to public fear).
8
E.g., United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111-12 (D. Mass. 2000).
9
See United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the
proper approach in downward departure decisions is to compare any given defendant,
regardless of the offense of which he has been convicted, to all defendants, and not
those similarly situated with respect to the offense of conviction), vacating as moot 74 F.
Supp. 2d 69, 71 (D. Mass. 1999) (using the presentence reports of fifty-four individuals
sentenced for crack offenses in the same district and during the same time period as
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Or that it finally took Booker to permit judges to implement a de minimus proportionality principle—that the sentences of one defendant
10
should be proportional to that of codefendants in the same case.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to understand in any depth
what it is about the American judiciary or American judicial traditions
that makes proportionality analysis so much more problematic here
than in other countries. My purpose is descriptive. I describe how the
same problems that afflict constitutional proportionality analysis spill
over into other arenas, to the appellate courts in ordinary sentencing
appeals, and ultimately to the Sentencing Commission. It is like an
old comic strip, Alphonse and Gaston: “After you, Alphonse,” says Gaston. Alphonse replies, “No, Gaston after you.” Since neither will pro11
ceed before the other, they fail to get anything done.
While the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional implications of sentencing issues when the issue is a binary one—life or
death and life with or without parole—it has been unwilling to impose
constitutional limits on scalable punishments—the length of time an
individual may be constitutionally imprisoned for a crime. The Court
has concluded that the death penalty is disproportionately harsh for
12
rape, for a crime committed when the defendant was under eight13
14
een, or for a mentally retarded individual. But where imprisonment
is concerned, as Youngjae Lee noted, the Court’s decisions reflect a
“meaningless muddle,” a “conceptual confusion” of “incoherent” ra15
tionales. According to a plurality of the Court in Ewing v. California, a
sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive so long as it can be justi16
fied under any one of the traditional justifications of punishment —
the defendant as a reference point to determine whether downward departure was
appropriate).
10
See Ryan Scott Reynolds, Equal Justice Under Law: Post-Booker, Should Federal Judges
Be Able to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between Codefendants’ Sentences?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 538, 552-55 (2009) (finding that most circuits allow
judges to consider codefendant disparity in sentencing).
11
See, e.g., Frederick Burr Opper, You First, My Dear, WIKIMEDIA, http://upload.
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4b/Alphonsegaston.jpg (last visited Mar. 15,
2012).
12
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
13
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
14
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
15
Young jae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV.
677, 681, 684 (2005).
16
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). It should be noted that in Ewing, no position had a majority other than the general holding that the punishment was constitutionally valid. The plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 14.
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not a particularly high bar. The plurality could find no overarching
theory by which it could set limits on a legislature’s determination of
17
imprisonment (although it had no such problem evaluating the ex18
cessiveness of punitive damages ). Since the Constitution is not clear
regarding the metes and bounds of “cruel and unusual punishment”
as applied to imprisonment, the plurality implies that the Court lacks
either the competence or the legitimacy to make the decision in most
cases. To choose one penological purpose and evaluate the sentence
in reference to it would be to overstep the Court’s role. Instead, the
Court must defer to the legislature’s choices of punishments and the
19
justifications for them.
In Ewing, for example, the Court held that a prison term of twentyfive years to life under California’s three-strikes law was not excessive
20
for the crime of shoplifting golf clubs worth $1200 by a repeat offender.
General, ill-defined notions of deterrence and incapacitation were
sufficient to justify the law. The Court noted that the recidivism statute “is nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person
commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly
serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the State’s
21
judgment as to whether to grant him parole.” And the legislature is
better suited to make “societal decisions” than the Court: “[F]ederal
courts should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment, and . . . successful challenges to the proportionality of
22
Indeed, Justice
particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.”
17

For this proposition, the Court cited Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which noted
that the Constitution “does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.
18
While the Court is reluctant to address Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis in the context of imprisonment, it has no such problem with respect to punitive damages. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of
Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1152 (2006) (“Beyond the
historical and doctrinal difficulties with the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence, one
may marvel at how odd it is for the Court ardently to impose prohibitions against punitive dollar awards beyond a certain amount while it freely permits states to imprison
petty repeat offenders to life imprisonment.” (footnotes omitted)).
19
The Ewing plurality noted: “A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales
is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.” Ewing,
538 U.S. at 25 (citations omitted).
20
Id. at 30.
21
Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (quoting Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278 (1980)).
22
Id. at 22 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)).
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Scalia, concurring in the judgment, was characteristically more emphatic: The proportionality principle, unmasked, raises policy ques23
tions, not issues of law, and policy questions do not belong in courts.
It is ironic, however, that the Court in Ewing, and earlier in Solem v.
24
Helm, did articulate an empirical, comparative approach that would
have cabined the Court’s analysis, like the Court’s methodology in
death penalty cases. The Solem approach looks to three factors to decide whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the
Eighth Amendment: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
25
the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Factors (ii) and (iii) compose
a comparative analysis that at the very least roots the Court’s evaluation in concrete facts—how other jurisdictions punish the same crime
and how the same jurisdiction punishes other crimes—much the same
way an equal protection, rather than a substantive due process, ap26
proach does. Nevertheless, the plurality in Ewing refused to insist on
this approach in all Eighth Amendment cases. Rather, it held that the
Eighth Amendment did not mandate a comparative analysis “within
27
and between jurisdictions.”
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that the “absence of a black-letter
rule does not disable” courts from determining the “outer limits on
23

Justice Scalia offered,

Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads into
the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all punishment
should be reasonably proportionate to the gravity of the offense, but rather the
unstated proposition that all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the criminal law. That formulation would make it clearer than
ever, of course, that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy.
Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
24
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
25
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292).
26
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy?, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105,
106-07 (noting that while there is some “indeterminacy” in equality claims that leaves
room for judicial discretion, the degree of indeterminacy is greater in substantive due
process doctrines such as the privacy doctrine because it “inappropriately requires
judges to decide what is important in life”); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428,
1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he practical difficulties of defining the requirements imposed by equal protection, while not insignificant, do not involve the judiciary in the
same degree of value-based line-drawing that the Supreme Court . . . found so troublesome in defining the contours of substantive due process.”), vacated and aff’d on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
27
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

Gertner FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/21/2012 3:30 PM

On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality

1591
28

sentencing authority that the Eighth Amendment imposes.” Determining the “outer limits,” to Justice Stevens, was no different from
identifying the kinds of lines American courts must draw in other situ29
ations. Indeed, what Justice Stevens did not say is that this kind of
analysis is one in which high courts of other countries easily engage.
Justice Breyer’s dissent went one step further, demonstrating just
how proportionality lines might be drawn. First, using a traditional
common law, case-by-case analysis, Justice Breyer situated Ewing’s sentence relative to those imposed in other cases raising Eighth Amendment challenges, noting that it was shorter than the defendant’s in
30
31
Solem, but twice as long as that in an earlier case, Rummel v. Estelle.
Yet, nothing in the record justified the differential treatment. Justice
Breyer then turned to a comparative analysis, considering how this
32
offense is treated in other state jurisdictions. Nevertheless, he could
not persuade a majority of the Court that his approach was properly
judicial—that is, grounded more in objective facts, than subjective
policy preferences, well within the competence of the judiciary, and a
legitimate exercise of the judicial role.
Apart from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the same “muddle”
33
that Lee describes afflicting constitutional proportionality analysis
has also come to characterize American sentencing in the “ordinary”
case. Michael Tonry, using almost identical words as Lee, noted that
sentencing policy is “fragmented,” and a “muddle” without any “widely
shared understandings about what sentencing can or should accomplish
34
or about conceptions of justice it should incorporate or reflect.”
Prior to sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing rules,
American judges navigated through this muddle during a sentencing
28

Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 33-34.
30
Id. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 282). In Solem, the
defendant received life for writing a bad check. 463 U.S. at 281-82.
31
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 266-68 (1980)). In Rummel, the defendant received life with eligibility for parole
at twelve years for felony theft. 445 U.S. at 266-67.
32
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 42-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Lee noted, “comparative desert” analysis is better suited for judicial enforcement than noncomparative desert. Lee,
supra note 15, at 716. He outlines two kinds of “comparative desert” analysis. The first is
a type of overbreadth analysis that asks “whether the sentencing scheme sufficiently distinguishes among offenders of different levels of seriousness.” Id. The second inquiry
“asks whether the punishment in question stands in appropriate relation to punishment
for crimes that are as serious as, or more serious than, the crime at issue.” Id.
33
Lee, supra note 15, at 681.
34
Tonry, supra note 3, at 1.
29

Gertner FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/21/2012 3:30 PM

1592

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 160: 1585

regime that has been described as the “indeterminate sentencing”
35
period. Judges were the acknowledged experts in sentencing, with
36
considerable discretion that they zealously guarded. “Indeed, judges
believed that they were so skilled at sentencing that they resisted all
efforts to restrict their discretion . . . . Sentencing discretion was cen37
tral to their work, a pillar of judicial independence.” Many judges
were unalterably opposed to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Sen38
tencing Reform Act of 1984, testifying against it in Congress and even
39
declaring the Act to be unconstitutional.
To be sure, as I have written elsewhere, there were substantial
problems with the indeterminate sentencing regime and its emphasis
40
on judicial “expertise.” Judges did not receive training about how to
exercise their discretion. Law schools did not offer courses on the subject. Professors taught criminal procedure as if there was nothing to
study after the jury announced its verdict or the defendant pled guilty.
And, unlike judges in other common law countries, federal judges
41
successfully resisted appellate review of sentencing. Without appellate review, judges had little incentive to generate principles of sentencing for future cases. Few bothered to write sentencing opinions at
35

Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2007).
36
I have characterized this period in the following manner:
During the indeterminate sentencing period, the principle purpose of sentencing was rehabilitation. And from that purpose flowed a different idea of
who was an expert and different procedures to serve that expertise. The judge
was the “expert” in individualizing the sentence to reflect the goals of punishment, including rehabilitation. His or her role was essentially therapeutic,
much like a physician. Fundamentally different standards evolved between the
trial stage and the sentencing stage, as befitting the very different roles of
judges and juries. The trial stage was the stage of rights, evidentiary rules, and
high standards of proof. In the sentencing stage, in contrast, the rules of evidence did not apply; the standard of proof was the lowest in the criminal justice system, a fair preponderance of the evidence. The approach made sense.
You would no more limit the kind of information that a judge should receive
in order to exercise his or her “clinical” sentencing role than you would limit
the information available to a medical doctor in determining a diagnosis.
Id. at 527 (footnote omitted).
37
Id. at 524.
38
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18
and 28 U.S.C.).
39
See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 195-96 n.12 (noting that two hundred district court judges held the Sentencing Reform Act unconstitutional prior to the Supreme Court’s upholding it in 1989).
40
Gertner, supra note 7, at 571.
41
Id. at 572.
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42

all. As a result, while judges were supposed to be experts in sentencing and were certainly competent to assume that role with adequate
support and training, their actual expertise was mythological.
Congress did not help. It proved incapable of rationalizing the
43
federal criminal code, notwithstanding nearly twenty years of effort.
Whenever Congress added a new crime to the substantive criminal law,
“there was little if any effort to reconcile new crimes and old ones or to
44
order offenses according to their relative severity,” as some states had
45
done when enacting the Model Penal Code.
In effect, the Sentencing Reform Act ceded the responsibility to
make decisions about proportionality to an independent agency in the
judicial branch, the United States Sentencing Commission. The guidelines would be promulgated by an “expert” Commission, whose goal
was to rationalize the sentencing rules, to bring to bear the latest scientific studies in effectuating all of the purposes of punishment, and
to do the kind of legwork determining the appropriate sentencing
practices that Congress had been unable or unwilling to do. And, in
addition to its scientific studies about sentencing, the Commission
would use the approach of “limited retribution” to set the maximum
and minimum sentences for offenses and to rank punishments depending on the characteristics of the offenses and offenders.
While initially it was an open question whether the new experts
would supplement or supplant the judges, over time, for reasons I have
described elsewhere, the Sentencing Guidelines effectively became
46
47
mandatory. The job of a judge became like that of a “clerk” —to
apply the Commission’s edicts, not to engage in a proportionality

42

Id.
Id. at 573.
44
Id.
45
See Bibas, supra note 7, at 967 & n.26 (observing that the Model Penal Code was
an effective force in motivating legislatures to rationalize their criminal codes).
46
Gertner, supra note 35, at 529.
47
In effect, American sentencing judges became the functional equivalent of civil
code judges. As John Merryman noted of the civil code system,
43

The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. . . . His function is merely to find
the right legislative provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically produced from the union. The whole
process of judicial decision is made to fit into the formal syllogism of scholastic
logic. The major premise is in the statute, the facts of the case furnish the minor
premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985).
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analysis of her own. The task of appellate courts was to review whether
48
the sentencing judge had correctly applied the Guidelines.
The Sentencing Commission, however, like Congress, failed to
enact rational Guidelines and eschewed making any proportionality
decisions. The Commission did not engage in the “profoundly difficult” task of identifying sentencing purposes, electing instead “an empirical approach that uses data estimating the existing sentencing
49
system as a starting point,” but then increasing sentences willy nilly.
Indeed, the Guidelines mirrored the patchwork quilt that had characterized the federal substantive law. For example, guidelines for drug
50
crimes were much harsher than those for violent crimes, and guidelines for receiving child pornography could be higher than those for
51
child abuse, violating proportionality norms and ultimately lacking
consistency with the other purposes of sentencing.
Significantly, after the Supreme Court brought an end to twenty
years of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines by declaring them
advisory in United States v. Booker, it became apparent that American
judges had changed their attitudes towards sentencing. Even in “ordinary” sentencing—quite apart from cases involving constitutional
analysis—many judges no longer believed they had the competence to
deal with sentencing issues (using language which resonated with
52
Justice Scalia’s concerns in Ewing). Indeed, many judges came to
48

See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261,
265-67 (2009) (describing the initial ambiguity as to whether federal judges would critically evaluate the Guidelines or enforce them mechanically).
49
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, intro. ((“The Basic Approach”)
policy statement) (1987).
50
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the
perverse result under the Guidelines that a first-time distributor of child pornography
would receive a sentence of at least 168 to 210 months, while a person who had actually
sexually assaulted a child would receive 151 to 188 months).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (D. Neb. 2005) (“I
now decide that the crack Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, should be given heavy
weight after Booker.”), aff’d, 439 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1060 (2008).
In Tabor, in a section entitled, “We Are Likely to Muck Things Up Even More if We Do
Our Own Thing,” id. at 1060, Judge Kopf noted:
Simply stated, unlike Congress or the Commission, we judges lack the institutional capacity (and frankly, the personal competence) to set and then enforce
one new, well-chosen, theoretically coherent, national standard. As opposed
to a uniform, albeit flawed, Guideline, it would make things far worse to have a
bunch of different standards for crack sentencing. For that reason alone, we
should sit on our collective hands and give the crack Guidelines substantial or
heavy weight until Congress decides otherwise.
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believe that they were not competent to sentence at all, absent explicit
rules promulgated by Congress or the Sentencing Commission. Court
after court insisted that the advisory Guidelines were entitled to con53
siderable, even presumptive, weight. As with the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the implication was clear: The political branches had
greater expertise in this area than judges did. It took several cases in
which the Supreme Court effectively said “As to advisory guidelines—
54
we mean it!” in order to make clear that individual judges may con55
sider the Guidelines but are not bound by them.
After Booker, which charged the courts of appeals with reviewing
sentencing decisions for procedural and substantive reasonableness,
56
rather than only for compliance with the Guidelines, it became clear
that circuit judges were still wandering through the same muddle
about purposes and proportionality as had existed before the Guidelines. For the most part, courts reviewed the guideline compliance
and the procedural, not substantive, reasonableness of the decisions
57
below. Substantive reasonableness foundered on the same shoals as
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Rarely did circuit judges overturn
sentences within the Guideline ranges.

Id. at 1061.
53
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding that “considerable weight should be given to the Guidelines in determining
what sentence to impose”).
54
See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam) (“The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed
reasonable.”); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 263-64 (2009) (per curiam) (stating that district courts can choose to depart from Guidelines “based on policy disagreement with them”); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) (“[T]he
Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several . . . .”); Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (observing that “the Guidelines are now advisory”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007) (explaining that Booker held unconstitutional the aspects of the Guidelines that made them mandatory).
55
See Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 137 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/50.pdf
(noting that simply “announcing that the Guidelines are advisory does not make them
so,” and urging the appellate courts to critically evaluate Guideline sentences (emphasis omitted)).
56
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-64 (2005).
57
The courts’ approaches to sentencing appeals reflect the concerns raised by William Stuntz that our Constitution overprotects procedural rights and underprotects
substantive rights. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011). But with “ordinary sentencing,” engaging with substantive concerns is unavoidable. Someone must make proportionality decisions, and after Booker, that “someone” is the judicial system.
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The post-Booker world does not have to look like this. Booker encourages scholars, judges, lawyers, and students to participate in a new,
multilayered discussion about federal sentencing. To make the Guidelines truly advisory, sentencing decisionmakers must identify alternative sentencing frameworks independent of the Guidelines and its
policies. While applying an alternative sentencing regime in cases with
Eighth Amendment or other constitutional or federalism concerns may
be difficult, no comparable problems exist in “ordinary” sentencing.
I will close by noting that courts have a variety of tools at their disposal in making sentencing decisions, tools that are capable of being
applied to like cases. Several of the lower courts have created a body
of law that critically evaluates the Guidelines, exposing them to some58
thing akin to an administrative procedure review. With respect to
some of the purposes of sentencing, rehabilitation, or deterrence, for
example, judges can consider scientific studies in creating sentencing
standards. In addition to research concerning evidence-based practices,
courts have the means to engage in meaningful comparative deserts
analysis along the lines of Justice Breyer’s approach in Ewing. Today,
judges can study data on local and national sentencing patterns to understand where a given offender fits in the larger regional or national
59
picture. The Sentencing Commission can become a repository of
information about evidence-based practices and regional and national
patterns, rather than simply the “Guideline police.”
The absence of a coherent theory at this moment in the development of sentencing law—Lee’s and Tonry’s muddle—could well lead
to a more creative moment, when the “old” sentencing experts, judges,
reexamine existing sentencing standards, and carve out common law
58

See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (evaluating
critically the child pornography Guidelines in the light of the statutory sentencing purposes). The court noted:
This deference to the Guidelines is not absolute or even controlling; rather,
like our review of many agency determinations, “[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”
Id. at 188 (alterations in original) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)); cf. Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing
a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 231 (2005) (recommending the creation of a new sentencing agency that would be subject to judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
59
See, e.g., United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89-91 (D. Mass. 2008)
(comparing the case of one defendant to similarly situated defendants in the district).
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rules alongside the Guidelines and the “new” experts, the Commission.
The Commission did not do very well in clarifying and rationalizing
sentencing; there is reason to believe that sentencing judges—with
Guidelines, and sentencing opinions at both the appellate and district
court levels—can do better. Alphonse-Gaston no more.

